Tumultuous Tides: Explaining and Understanding the Perpetuation of the South China Sea Conflict by Hermans, C.G.C.
 Tumultuous Tides 
Explaining and Understanding the Perpetuation of the 
South China Sea Conflict 
Carlijn G.C. Hermans 
 
LEIDEN UNIVERSITY 
July, 2012 
 
 !C.G.C.!Hermans ,ii,!
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy 
joint programme of Leiden University 
& 
the Netherlands Institute of International Relations ‘Clingendael’ 
Supervisor: Dr. Frans – Paul van der Putten 
Second Reader: Dr. Niels van Willigen 
 
C.G.C. Hermans 
Studentno. S1051695 
Leiden, July 2012 
 !Tumultuous!Tides ,iii,!
 
Acknowledgements 
This thesis has been kept on track and been seen through to completion with the 
invaluable support and encouragement of numerous people. First and foremost I would 
like to express my gratitude to Dr. Frans-Paul van der Putten, my thesis supervisor, 
without whose encouragement, guidance, patience and support from the initial proposal 
to the final version this project would not have come to fruition. I also owe a debt of 
gratitude to my internship supervisors, Arjen van den Berg and Rob Anderson, and other 
colleagues at the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherland in Beijing, who have 
introduced me to invaluable contacts whose ideas have been the inspiration for the 
theoretical framework of this thesis. I am also indebted to my friends, fellow students, 
and family for their support and encouragement throughout the processes. Last but 
certainly not least I would like to thank all my well wishers who have kept track of me 
during this time and have sent their support, it has certainly been much appreciated. 
   
 !C.G.C.!Hermans ,iv,!
 
Table of Contents 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................ iii 
Abstract ....................................................................................... v 
1. Introduction ............................................................................... 1 
2. Theoretical framework .................................................................. 5 
2.1. Processual constructivism .......................................................................... 6 
2.1.1 Explaining Chinese behavior ............................................................................ 8 
2.1.2 Processes and relations ..................................................................................... 9 
2.1.3. Hypothesis ................................................................................................... 11 
2.2. Hedging strategies and the balance of power ............................................. 11 
2.2.1. Defining “hedging” ...................................................................................... 12 
2.2.2. Balance of power .......................................................................................... 14 
2.2.3. Hypothesis ................................................................................................... 15 
2.3 Regional multilateralism ........................................................................... 15 
2.3.1 Asian Regionalism ........................................................................................ 16 
2.3.2. Multilateralism ............................................................................................ 18 
2.3.3. Hypothesis ................................................................................................... 19 
3. The Middle Kingdom ................................................................. 20 
3.1. Relations with its neighbors ..................................................................... 20 
3.2. Gradations of identity .............................................................................. 21 
3.3. Nine dragons stirring up the sea ............................................................... 25 
3.3.1 Stakeholders and foreign policymaking ........................................................... 27 
3.3.2. Conflicting identities ..................................................................................... 31 
3.3.3. Identities, interests and consequences ............................................................. 33 
4. Vietnam and the Philippines ......................................................... 35 
4.1 The 1974 confrontation on the Paracel Islands ........................................... 36 
4.2. The 1988 confrontation in the Spratly Islands ........................................... 37 
4.3. The 1995 and 1999 run-in in the Mischief Reef ......................................... 38 
4.4. Between the lines ..................................................................................... 39 
4.5. Striking a balance .................................................................................... 39 
5. ASEAN ................................................................................... 40 
5.1. Why ASEAN? ......................................................................................... 40 
5.2. Peace and resolutions .............................................................................. 42 
6. Conclusion .............................................................................. 46 
Bibliography ................................................................................ 50 
 
  
 !Tumultuous!Tides ,v,!
 
 
Abstract 
The South China Sea has been an area of perpetual tension between China, 
Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Brunei, and 
Indonesia. Since 1970 there have only been a few notable encounters between nations 
but plenty of strong discourse. What makes the conflict stand out is that during all these 
years there has been no escalation but no resolution either. There has been ample 
research done as to what possible solutions for the conflict may be, with varying degrees 
of feasibility. What is severely lacking is a better understanding of how this perpetual 
status quo is possible. This research looks for answers in three different theoretical 
schools, namely processual constructivism, hedging, and regional multilateralism. While 
the first particularly novel theory holds substantial explanatory power as far as China is 
concerned it fails to incorporate the behavior of other states. Hedging strategies in turn 
explain the absence of escalation rather well but not so much the absence of a resolution. 
It is a theory that focuses on Southeast Asian states and not all parties involved. Finally, 
regional multilateralism best explains the perpetuation of the conflict as well as the 
absence of a resolution. Ultimately, all these theories complement each other and 
altogether contribute to a much better understanding of the conflict.  
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1. Introduction 
Sun Tzu once said, “the highest excellence is never having to fight because the 
commencement of battle signifies a political failure” (Tzu, 2006, p. 5). One may wonder 
what Sun Tzu would have said about the absence of a resolution of a conflict for over 25 
years, not having been ended by neither peaceful nor violent means. The South China 
Sea has been a disputed territory for many years. Some states have made claims on the 
basis of historic records that date back to almost 200 BC, and military involvement (short 
of war) dates back to the 1970’ (SIIA, 2011). The territory South China Sea itself is part 
of the Pacific Ocean that encompasses an area from the Singapore and Malacca Straits to 
the Strait of Taiwan and totals around 3,500,000 square kilometers. The area's 
importance largely results from one-third of the world's shipping transiting through its 
waters, and from the belief that it holds huge oil and gas reserves beneath its seabed 
(Morton & Blackmore, 2001). As such, a great many interests converge. 
The South China Sea contains numerous islands (they number in the hundreds), 
which collectively form an archipelago. Though the islands are mostly uninhabited they 
are subject to competing claims of sovereignty by several countries. The Spratly Islands 
alone are known under at least 6 different names. It is suggested that the reason for the 
competing claims might be that the maritime zones in the area were never effectively 
incorporated within the delimited and demarcated domains of each colonial power. The 
main issues in the South China Sea are both irredentism, as well as a more ‘conventional’ 
expansionism. These issues have pertained to the islands, reefs, atolls and cays in the 
South China Sea and their attendant maritime space. It is important to note that the 
conflicts do not involve settled peoples in search of political redemption, in fact the 
majority of the islands don’t have now or have ever before sustained life (Leifer, 1999). 
The southerly Spratly Islands see the most complex set of competing claims to sovereign 
jurisdiction (Phy, 2009). These islands in particular lack both geographic and legal 
coherence because there is no agreed definition of their territory. Moreover, not all 
claimant states treat the entire group of islands as a single ‘geolegal entity’ (USEIA, 
2008). Additionally, the fact that not only do the islands enjoy occupancy of a variety of 
states, they also have overlapping claims. For this reason issues of sovereignty over the 
islands cannot be addressed conclusively at the bilateral level, although this certainly has 
been attempted (Yoshihara & Holmes, 2011) 
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While over the years there have been a veritable abundance of suggestions for 
possible resolutions (varying in both feasibility and originality), comparatively little 
research has been done into the reasons for the perpetuation of this low intensity conflict 
(Mearsheimer, 2010)1. The proposed solutions include using international law, bilateral 
and multilateral diplomatic efforts in various fora, and outright military confrontation 
(Rousseau, 2011). Most popular media, blogs, newspapers and the like instead seem 
rather interested in underlying motivations for the hostility. For example, the Economist 
recently questioned China’s intentions in the South China Sea and wondered what 
would come of it (Miles, 2011). Most media explanations tend to be Sinocentric, which is 
not strange considering most incidents that take place involve China in some way. 
Domestic responses to recent incidents are even more remarkable to outsiders, 
particularly Westerners. Recently, the host of CCTV’s2 most prominent English language 
news program ‘dialogue’, Yang Rui, wrote on his microblog (weibo) that the Philippine 
treatment of Chinese fisherman was reproachful. The language he used for this was 
rather strong and colorful. Yang Rui ended his post by stating ‘don’t try to mess with us 
or it’ll be no more Mr. Nice Guy’ (Epstein, 2012). It is argued that his view finds favor 
with high officials because government would have otherwise intervened3 (Epstein, 
2012). While similar reactionary comments have also been made in the Philippine and 
Vietnamese media, the prominence of Yang Rui is notable.  
Though the territorial disputes in the South China Sea have existed since the 
1970’, it does not mean that they are any less pertinent today, perhaps even more so. In a 
recent Foreign Policy issue that identifies the most germane challenges for the future, 
Robert D. Kaplan points towards the South China Sea as the area most likely to see 
violent conflict to break out in the nearest future (Kaplan, 2011). This point of view finds 
favor with more scholars, not in the least, John Mearsheimer. It is Mearsheimer in 
particular who points out that the conflict should have seen either escalation or a 
 
1 For other examples please see: Buszynski, Leszek. “ASEAN, the Declaration on Conduct, and the South 
China Sea.” Contemporary Southeast Asia 25, no. 3 (2003): 343-362.; Shephard, Allan. “Maritime tensions in 
the South China Sea and the neighborhood: Some solutions.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 17, no. 2 (1994).; 
Valencia, Mark J. “The East China Sea dispute: Context, claims, issues, and possible solutions.” Asian 
Perspectives 31, no. 1 (2007): 127-167.; Zhan, Jun. “China goes to the blue waters: The navy, seapower 
mentality and the South China sea.” Journal of Strategic Studies 17, no. 3 (1994). 
2 CCTV is a state owned and run news station, as such, considerable weight is attached to the news it 
presents, both on and off camera. 
3 CCTV itself has given a reaction on Yang Rui’s most recent rants concerning the ousting of Al Jazeera 
English reporter Melissa K. Chan, whom he referred to as a foreign bitch. CCTV stated that the presenter’s 
views expressed on his blog are ‘his own personal opinions’. 
 !Tumultuous!Tides ,3,!
 
resolution considering one of the parties is a great power with substantial military 
capabilities whereas the other parties are much smaller and of less significance 
(Mearsheimer, 2010). Interestingly, there is very little research done as to what could be 
the underlying cause for the perpetuation of the conflict at a low intensity. Most research 
regarding the conflict in the South China Sea focuses on a resolution to the conflict, 
divination where the conflict is headed, the legality of the various claims, and 
implications for various foreign policies (mostly that of the US) (International Crisis 
Group, 2012)4. For this reason this thesis will have as an objective to identify what 
explains the perpetuation of the conflict in the South China Sea. This conflict will be 
characterized as one of low-intensity due to the lack in military escalation as well as a 
lack of military threats.  
In order to answer the question mentioned above two sub-questions will be 
explored (1) why has the conflict, given the stakes involved, not escalated yet?; and (2) 
why, given those same stakes, has no resolution been found to the problem either? At the 
basis of this research lie three hypotheses, namely that the best explanation could be 
found either in (1) processual constructivism on China’s part, (2) hedging strategies on 
the part of Vietnam and the Philippines, or (3) that Asian regionalism in combination 
with multilateralism may be a more likely cause. The validity and applicability of these 
hypotheses will be judged for the period of 1970 to 2010. This period was chosen since 
the 1970’ saw the first military encounter between China and Vietnam, then South 
Vietnam, in 1974 when China seized South Vietnam’s military units in the Paracels. Not 
one year later South Vietnam occupied the Spratly Islands over which China had earlier 
claimed sovereignty (Samuels, 1984). By 1988 China and now Unified Vietnam come to 
blows over the Spratly Islands. In 1992 there is another military confrontation between 
China and Vietnam, this time however it is of much smaller proportion and a peaceful 
solution is found. Around three years later in 1995 China and the Philippines find 
 
4 For example: Bateman, Sam, and Ralf Emmers. Security and International Politics in the South China Sea: 
Towards a co-operative management regime. New York: Routledge, 2008; Frost, Ellen L., James J. Przystup, and 
Philip C. Saunders. “China’s Rising Influence in Asia: Implications for U.S. Policy.” Strategic Forum, 2008: 
1-8.; Hu, Nien-Tsu Alfred. “South China Sea: Troubled Water or a Sea of Opportunity.” Ocean Development 
& International Law, 2010: 203-213.; Koo, Min Gyo. Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia: 
Between a Rock and a Hard Place. New York: Springer, 2010.; Liu, Tai-Ting Tony, and Ming-Te Hung. “Sino-
U.S. Strategic Competition in Southeast Asia: China’s Rise and U.S. Foreign Policy Transformation since 
9/11.” Political Perspectives 2011 5, no. 3 (2011): 96-119.; Snyder, Scott. The South China Sea Dispute: Prospects 
for Preventive Diplomacy. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009, 1-29.; Weissmann, Mikael. 
“The South China Sea Conflict and Sino-Asean Relations: A Study In Confict Prevention and Peace 
Building.” Asian Perspective 34, no. 3 (2010): 35-69. 
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themselves in a conflict over the aptly named Mischief Reef (Emmers, 2010). Save minor 
skirmishes from this point on all parties assert their claims and start using international 
law to do so. In 2005, Vietnam, the Philippines and China signed an agreement to 
protect oil resources in the South China Sea (P.R.C. MFA, 2005). The end of the time 
period is drawn at 2009 since this marked the return of the US to Asia. The US’ pivot 
(the term most commonly used for the new US foreign policy in Asia) has altered the 
dynamics to such extend it can be questioned whether the conflict is even the same as 
before (International Crisis Group, 2012). 
This research will explore the three different proposed theories, develop a 
hypothesis as to how they may be used and then test the hypothesis in individual 
chapters. Finally an answer will be given to the research question and conclusions will be 
drawn as to the compatibility of the proposed theories. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
There are several schools of thought from which elements of the research 
question and sub-questions can be explored. The relevant overarching schools are 
constructivism, realism and liberalism, and within these schools, more specific theories 
have been chosen to cater to specific elements or parties in the conflict. These are (1) 
processual constructivism, to explain the impact of identity and identity formation on 
Chinese foreign policy; (2) hedging strategy in the context of the balance of power, to 
help explain the choice of Southeast Asian nations for certain foreign policy strategies 
and their impact on the conflict, and; (3) regional multilateralism, to identify the choice 
for a multilateral forum and the impact its constraints and benefits have had on China 
and the other Southeast Asian parties to the South China Sea conflict. 
The first, as a strand of constructivism will focus on relevance of building and 
maintaining of relationships to identity formations; and in turn how this continuous 
changing of identity affects relationships. It recognizes that actors, other than states are 
also relevant units of analysis. This theoretical approach is aimed at explaining the 
reason for the disconnect between Chinese rhetoric and foreign policy, and even the 
dichotomous (or even pluralistic) nature of Chinese foreign policymaking and the effects 
of all of this on the likelihood of escalation and likelihood of finding a resolution.  
The second approach, hedging in the context of the balance of power, provides 
insight into how a particular set of foreign policy strategies can affect political situations. 
While this approach has a relational component, the focus is on the formation of (and 
motivation for) certain strategies and later their impact on political situations. While 
characterized by pragmatism hedging is not devoid of ideals. As such, during some 
periods in time it was deemed better to avert war and at others there was enough room 
and motivation to stand ground on old claims. While it is recognized as a strategy that 
can be used by all states, it’s also observed that it is mostly employed by smaller states. 
The third and final combination of theories also deals with relations but caters 
more to the conflict resolution part of the research question. It is a model that does not 
look on one or more sides of the conflict but it takes the parties that are discussed in the 
first and second model and looks at them in regional multilateral context. This model 
entails looking at the opportunities and constraints of working within a multilateral 
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framework like an international organization. More specifically regional multilateralism 
looks at more unique situation in East Asia and Southeast Asia, and why the parties 
chose to pursue a solution within an Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
framework. However, the multilateral framework in which the parties to the conflict 
attempt to find a solution may even be the cause of the perpetuation of the conflict.  
Essentially, in the end there are three models, the first two will look at specific 
parties to the conflict, and the last model looks at them in a multilateral context. 
2.1. Processual constructivism 
As some authors have pointed out, the problem with defining China’s position in 
the world it is that it is difficult to characterize in traditional terms (Qin, 2009, p. 11). Qin 
himself even argues for a separate theory of international relations that specifically caters 
to China because he believes that traditional theory falls short in this respect (Qin, 2007). 
While this is an interesting view, it does not find much support in the academic 
community. Chen Qingchang makes a compelling argument against Qin’s quest for a 
Chinese school of international relations theory. He argues that re-envisioning 
international relations (IR) in Asia is not about discovering or producing as many 
‘indigenous’ national schools of IR as possible. Instead he deems it better for the 
discipline to reorient itself towards a post-Western era that does not reinforce the 
hegemony of the West both within and without the discipline (Chen C. , 2011).  
And even if local scholars could succeed in crafting a distinctly Chinese School, 
where would the creation of new schools stop? While Qin makes an interesting 
argument, it could be argued that the new theory Qin proposes is in fact but ‘derivative 
discourse’ of Western modernist social science. Though this at first glance seems 
negative, there is nothing wrong with pursuing a different direction within a set theory, 
but whether this warrants a whole different school of thought is a different question. For 
the purpose of this thesis then, Qin’s proposed theory of processual constructivism will be 
taken as a different strand of existing constructivism5.  
 
5 The major theories that processual constructivism draws on are constructivist international relations 
theories, discussions on social relations from both Western and Eastern sociology, and politics and 
theoretical achievements in the field of ‘relations’ in Chinese tradition by Chinese sociologists and social 
psychologists. For reference please see: Emirbayer, M. (1997). Manifesto for a Relational Sociology. The 
American Journal of Sociology , 103 (2), 281-317.; Jackson, P. T., & Nexon, D. H. (1999). Relations Before 
States: Substance, Process and the Study of World Politics. European Journal of International Relations , 5 (3), 
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Constructivism (sometimes also referred to as social constructivism) stresses the 
socially constructed nature of international relations. Constructivism holds that 
significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially contingent, 
instead of inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of 
world politics (Jackson & Nexon, 2002). The best known proponent of constructivism is 
Alexander Wendt who challenged the emphasis on materialism; something he saw as the 
main failings of realism and liberalism (Wendt, 1992). Wendt attempts to show that even 
core realist concepts like power politics are socially constructed. Essentially Wendt 
argues that these concepts are not given by nature and hence, capable of being 
transformed by human practice (Wendt, 1992). The traditional focus of constructivist 
research has been on identity and interests. More recently this focus has shifted to also 
include habitual and unreflective behavior and even linguistics (in the form of discourse 
analysis) (Neumann, 2002, p. 628). 
Processual constructivism was first developed as an explanation to the coming of 
peace and cooperation in East Asia. Qin’s first paper in 2007 aims to explain the 
situation by developing a process-focused model of regional cooperation. Qin describes 
processual constructivism as essentially being ’change through inter-subjectivity’ (Qin & 
Wei, 2007, p. 21) or the “gradual socialization of power” by involving a variety of actors 
in the process of integration (Qin & Wei, 2007, p. 23). What this boils down to is that 
through social interaction identity formation takes place and attributes power (or denies 
power) to the parties involved. At the same time it develops norms, rules; and even helps 
foster a collective identity (Qin & Wei, 2007). The process itself is thus both means and 
end. Everything surrounding the gradual formation of identities (collective and 
individual), norms and rules, is as significant as what results. This would follow, as 
identity is fluid and subject to change.  
The focus on identity and social construction are not the only aspects processual 
constructivism shares with Wendt’s constructivism, it also recognized that in 
international politics there are more influential actors than just states. The points where 
processual constructivism however differs from the traditional school as established by 
                                                                                                                                                              
291-332.; Kwang, K.-K. (2006). Constructive Realism and Confucian Relationalism. Indigenous and Cultural 
Psychology , 1-56.; Wendt, A. (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.; Wendt, A. (1987). The agent-structure problem in international relations theory. International 
Organization , 41 (3), 335-370.; Zhai, X. (2004). Favor, Face and Reproduction of the Power: A way of social 
exchange in an reasonableness society. Sociological Research , 1-15. 
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Wendt is, that its emphasis is on the process of the construction of identity and its 
relation to the attribution of power. In this sense it even starts to build a bridge toward 
realism. This also makes it different from newer strands of constructivism that advocate 
being as separate as possible from realism and liberalism. 
Hence, as processual constructivism helps explain power attribution, identity 
formation and perception, it is best equipped to explain China’s role in the conflict in the 
South China Sea. In Chinese foreign policy, power and the perception thereof play an 
important role. According to some it goes a long way to explain Chinese behavior 
(International Crisis Group, 2012).  
2.1.1 Explaining Chinese behavior 
Qin’s main point is that defining China in traditional terms, like realism does, is 
not only increasingly difficult, but it oversimplifies Chinese behavior and foreign policy 
making (Qin, 2007). Most recently it was the International Crisis Group (ICG) that 
pointed out the complexity of China’s rise to power and its consequences for its foreign 
policy making. The ICG argues that in spite of China’s recently acquired large power 
status, it still very much behaves as if it were a small power (Kleine-Alhbrandt, 2012). As 
a consequence, at times its foreign policy seems schizophrenic. This is caused by a 
number of facts, the most important two being China’s foreign policy formation and the 
influence of domestic politics on this process (International Crisis Group, 2012). The 
latter in particular is supported by Brantly Womack, who highlights that China is not 
always a unitary actor. According to him, this has a strong influence on how it can 
behave as a foreign policy actor (Womack, 2009). In a more recent article Womack has 
commented on Zhou Fangyin’s “Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System”. Zhou 
presents an important application of the game theory of patterns of interaction to China’s 
traditional diplomacy with its neighbors (Zhou, 2011). According to Womack, this 
analysis contradicts the realist expectation that the larger power would simply dominate 
smaller powers in the context of international anarchy (Womack, 2009, p. 11). 
Interestingly, unlike previous research, his explanation of the tributary system does not 
rely on a cultural explanation based on Confucian morality, but rather on processes of 
conflictual interaction that in turn leads to mutual accommodation between China and 
its neighbors. Womack finds Zhou correctly points to the capacity of resistance by 
smaller neighbors as key to the emergence of an equilibrium that was not based on 
domination (Womack, 2009, p. 3). Womack then goes a step further and addresses the 
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question of the relationship of China’s traditional diplomacy to its contemporary return 
as Asia’s major power (Womack, 2012). While the two authors take two different 
perspectives on the asymmetrical relationship between China and its neighbors, both 
have in common that they define China’s relationships and its perception of these 
relationships as being central to its behavior. 
2.1.2 Processes and relations 
Interestingly, while the discipline is called international “relations,” there is little 
powerful theory on relations itself. Structural realism pays the least attention to 
“relations” and discusses process hardly at all. Although neo-liberal institutional scholars 
hold that they attach importance to process, they only ever take it as a background or a 
platform, almost all the focus goes to tangible factors like institutions. Once these are 
established, neo-liberal institutional scholars focus largely on causal relations between 
international institutions and state behavior (Qin, 2009, p. 7). As international 
institutions directly act on states, the process therefore becomes a black box that is 
henceforth largely ignored (Keohane, 2005, p. 211).  
Wendt’s structural constructivism also emphasizes process. In his earlier work he 
regards the structure-agent interaction as a process. In this process the agent and structure 
are both simultaneous and symbiotic, neither preceding the other. They mutually 
construct each other during their interaction. According to Wendt the structure then 
becomes the reason for the actor’s identity and self-identification (Wendt, 1987). Process 
also here falls into the background, as either a situation or a stage. Though process is an 
indispensable factor, it is not independent; it depends on and provides for agents and 
structures (Qin, 2011). 
Processual constructivism is then a theory that is both social and processual. It 
emphasizes the function of social construction and takes sociality as the key factor. At 
the same time it puts forward a mechanism of construction that is different from Wendt’s 
structural constructivism. What makes it different is that it looks at the process with 
relationality as its core. Qin sums this up as “the systemic level, social ontology and 
social evolution that together make up the theoretical orientation of processual 
constructivism” (Qin, 2009, p. 9). 
Qin’s main argument for processual constructivism is that process plays a key 
and irreplaceable role in social life. He defines process as “relations in motion”. In 
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essence, to maintain a process is to maintain and allow room for relationships to flow. 
This activates the interaction for identity construction. Because of its key role, process 
itself becomes the focus of practice (Qin, 2011, p. 12). This constructivist theoretical 
model incorporates and conceptualizes two key Chinese ideas – processes and relations 
(Qin, 2009). Conceptualizing relationality and treating it as the theoretical core, 
processual constructivism holds that relational networking in international society is an 
important aid to actors to form their identities and produce international power. For 
example, in the past as China established tributary relationships with other countries it 
defined identities on both sides of the relationship; China was the larger domineering 
power to which smaller and less powerful nations kowtowed and paid tribute to. The 
interaction, in other words the process, was as important as during the exchanges 
between the emperor’s men and the countries they requested tributes from, they asserted 
their cultural and economic prowess (Spence, 1999). In the present day diplomatic 
exchanges achieve the same result. However, as identity is fluid and subject to change, 
the perceived power changes as well. This does not only hold for perception between 
countries, it also holds for domestic perception and interaction. Recently there has been 
much domestic debate as to China’s actual power and its ability to project it. This debate 
takes place on a government level but also at the level of individual citizens. China’s 
‘netizens’, citizens active on the internet, are famous for the pressure they are able to put 
on the government. Hence, the debate about the level of power and power projection 
capabilities China has involves all those actors, an in turn, through the complex system 
of Chinese policymaking, China’s foreign policy (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 
18). 
Processual constructivism focuses on interactive practices among actors and 
emphasizes the independent development and realization of social processes that play a 
meaningful role in constructing international norms and state identities (Qin, 2009, p. 
18). For example, relations can enlarge power or constrain power. In any relational web, 
relations always influence the exercising of power. In China’s patriarchal society, a 
father’s power over his son is absolute and supreme. This kind of power is not based 
upon the substantive capabilities, like physical or mental capabilities. The power of the 
father is infinite because Confucian patriarchal society gives this definition to the father-
son relations. While the power is infinite, Confucianism also allows the use of restraint in 
this respect (Qin, 2009, p. 19). 
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It is important to point out that process, is a highly meaningful concept in 
Chinese experience and thought. Fei Xiaotong, after comparing Chinese and Western 
social relations, holds that Western society is based upon individuality, while Chinese 
society knows individuality yet still links it inextricably to other individuals (Fei, 1992). 
According to Fei, individuals in Western society are independent from each other, 
resembling bundles of rice straw in the paddy fields; social contracts and institutions bind 
them together. Chinese social structure on the other hand, is like continuous circles of 
ripples on a lake. Each individual is the center of a ripple spread by social relations; and 
each circle and ripple is connected in one way or another (Fei, 1992). Qin then argues 
that it is the continuity between the ripples that is process and the ripples constitute the 
networks of relations. Individuals and ripples, relating one with another, influence the 
numerous processes and are influenced by them as well (Qin, 2009, p. 8).  
As the ICG observes, China is still coming to terms with its new identity as a 
great power and still in many ways acts as if it were a small power. Processual 
constructivism may help to explain this, as it would look at China’s identity formation 
and the impact it has on Chinese foreign policy. 
2.1.3. Hypothesis 
If processual constructivism provides a good explanation for the absence of 
escalation as well as the absence of a resolution then this would be evident from the 
impact of identity and the formation of identity on the foreign policy that guides these 
events. Different and competing identities would alter the course of the policy, depending 
on the various levels of influence they can exert. The actors involved would publicize 
their views in various media (newspapers, policy papers, social media and the like).  
2.2. Hedging strategies and the balance of power 
Around 2002 a new word was added to international strategic discourse: 
“hedging”. Its use is featured often in respect to China and Southeast and East Asia in 
particular. The word itself is much older than its use in an international relations context. 
Webster defines it as “to protect (one's investment or an investor) against loss by making 
balancing or compensating contracts or transactions: the company hedged its investment 
position on the futures market.” Its application in strategic discourse is almost exactly the 
 !C.G.C.!Hermans ,12,!
 
same, it is under to be a strategy of protection against unfavorable other outcomes 
(Caouettea & Côté, 2011).  
Hedging behavior has since been ascribed to a variety of nations, the US, China, 
Japan and a variety of Southeast Asian nations6. The common denominator in all these 
studies into hedging, is the that the idea that the “hedger‟ does not simply adopt a 
containment or balancing strategy as opposed to engagement, but rather employs a 
mixture of the two, as insurance against the uncertain present and future intentions of 
target states (Goh, 2006, p. 1). This strategy can be used by larger nations but it used 
mostly by smaller states. This is because they often do not have the power or the 
projection capabilities to set a singular clear course. For example, if the Philippines were 
to only side with the US, its economy would suffer greatly because that would prompt 
China to take repercussions (Foot, 2006). 
2.2.1. Defining “hedging” 
While realists may argue differently, that what has traditionally been referred to 
as hedging behavior, is really the norm in international relations. This is because the 
combinations of engagement and diplomacy have been the staple of international 
relations. In fact, adopting insurance policies is the rule, not the exception. While states 
establish military relationships with certain nations, they avoid committing themselves to 
potentially antagonistic stances toward other states. For any state, the majority of foreign 
policy and diplomacy is about preserving the maximum range of strategic options. Small- 
and medium-size states rarely engage in true balancing because it is too costly. Large and 
powerful states in turn are as bold and overconfident to adopt strategies aimed at power 
maximization or god forbid, world domination (Goh, 2006). Hence, a hedge, like other 
 
6 A few notable examples are: Foot, R. (2006). Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: 
accommodating and hedging . 1 (82), 77-94.; Goh, E. (2005). Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in 
Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies . Policy Studies , 1-59.; He, B. (2011). Politics of 
Accommodation of the Rise of China: the case of Australia. Journal of Contemporary China , 21 (73), 53-70.; 
Chung, C.-P. (2004). Southeast Asia - China Relations: Dialectics of "Hedging" and "Counter-Hedging". 
Southeast Asian Affairs , 35-53.; Medeiros, E. S. (2005). Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific 
Stability. The Washington Quarterly , 145-167.; Roy, D. (2005). Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or 
Bandwagoning? Contemporary Southeast Asia , 305-322.; Ruland, J. (2011). Southeast Asian Regionalism and 
Global Governance: “Multilateral Utility” or “Hedging Utility”? Contemporary Southeast Asia , 83-112. 
Tessman, B. (2012). System Structure and State Strategy: Adding Hedging to the Menu . Security Studies , 21 
(2), 192-231. Tessman, B., & Wolfe, W. (2011). Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of Chinese 
Energy Security Strategy. International Studies Review , 3, 214–240. 
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strategies is aimed at preventing or forcing a certain outcome. Countries can hedge 
against war, annexation or even to draw more parties into a conflict.  
The bipolar Cold War system may have seen superpowers adopt, to some extent, 
domination strategies, while other states were forced into a situation where they had to 
choose a side (or one was taken on their behalf). Arguably superpowers combined 
engagement with containment, particularly during the period of détente in the 1970s. 
This period in history however, is an anomaly. Since the end of the Cold War, most of 
the world has returned to the normal state of “hedging” in international affairs (Goh, 
2006). 
So what then is hedging? Hedging, as a strategy, is to be distinguished from 
straightforward strategic choices like, balancing, containment, bandwagoning, and 
buckpassing. What is important is that while it may be argued that hedging strategies 
encompass strategies like balancing or containment, the strategy as a whole must be 
different. There are several ways this can be done, for example through the inclusion of 
significant engagement and reassurance components, or – perhaps more important - the 
demonstration that containment strategies, like alliances have one or both of these 
components. These strategies are regarded as means to end, and that they are 
substantively different from those of straightforward balancing and/or containment 
(Goh, 2006). Perhaps the most complete definition of hedging is given by Evelyn Goh 
who submits that hedging is “a set of strategies aimed at avoiding (or planning for 
contingencies in) a situation in which states cannot decide upon more straightforward 
alternatives such as balancing, bandwagoning, or neutrality. Instead they cultivate a 
middle position that forestalls or avoids having to choose one side [or one 
straightforward policy stance] at the obvious expense of another.” (Goh, 2006, p. 3). 
Goh gives this definition particularly in the context of security strategies in the 
Asia – Pacific. She observes that in this region engagement policies are pursued at the 
same time as indirect balancing policies. In her words: “Indirect balancing policies are 
policies designed to counter the target state’s ability to constrain the subject state, either 
through non-specific deterrence or defense strengthening, or through building diplomatic, 
economic, and political relationships with third states or organizations that can be 
converted into leverage against the target state when relations with it deteriorate.” (Goh, 
2006, p. 4) 
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Goh is not alone in this observation; other authors before and after her have 
observed a variety of combinations of strategies that amount to a ‘hedge’. Denny Roy 
observes that hedging in Southeast Asia may include a variety of strategies, among which 
balancing and bandwagoning, but also engagement. In the case of many Southeast Asian 
nations this includes maintaining a modest level of defense cooperation with the United 
States. This could be called ‘low-intensity balancing’ against China as it does not 
confront China directly but does oppose its presence in the region. The best illustrations 
of this taking place are found in the cases of the Philippines and Singapore, and more 
subtly in Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia. Thailand is different still; it appears to 
practice simple hedging, while Myanmar at the same time has no reasonable alternative 
to cooperation with China (Roy, 2005, p. 305). Roy argues that the Southeast Asian 
region bandwagons with China only to the extent that it desires trade with China and 
seeks to avoid the prohibitive costs of alienating the region’s rising great power (Roy, 
2005, p. 306). In its own right, hedging is then a way for Southeast Asian nations to 
balance their own interests, i.e. take action when it matters strategically but otherwise 
maintain good trade relations (Medeiros, 2005).  
This combination of strategies becomes rather complex and as such, it is essential 
to ask what part of a combination of strategies is in fact the ‘hedge’ that was mentioned 
earlier. To give an example, for East Asian states vis-à-vis China, engagement would be 
the main policy and indirect balancing would be the hedge (Liu & Hung, 2011). Chien-
Peng Chung would call this type of hedging pragmatic hedging (Chung, 2004). Chung’s 
description would contribute to a more accurate description of hedging but would not 
change the definition as Goh proposed.  
2.2.2. Balance of power  
Finally, hedging fits within the broader spectrum of realism and the balance of 
power. The fact that hedging is a strand of realism is clear as it asserts, “hedging also 
helps prevent a geopolitical rivalry from becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy, another 
mutual core interest” (Medeiros, 2005, p. 305). Evan Medeiros points out that hedging 
contributes to maintaining the delicate balance of power that exists in Southeast Asia. 
Medeiros states that particularly in the case of the Philippines and Vietnam, their choice 
for hedging strategies could arguably be a manifestation of “security dilemma dynamics 
at work in a globalized world characterized by deep economic interdependence and the 
need for multilateral security cooperation” (Medeiros, 2005, p. 306). However, also for 
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this reason hedging is fraught with complications and dangers that may very well cause a 
shift toward rivalry and regional instability. Hedging is then essentially a delicate 
balancing act. In order to be effective and sustainable, hedging requires careful 
management of accumulating stresses between nations (Medeiros, 2005).  
2.2.3. Hypothesis 
Hedging allows states to minimize risk without excluding the gains. By applying 
hedging strategies a state can avoid costly consequences. Hence, if this theory is to 
explain the absence of escalation, it has to be evident that the strategies chosen hedged 
against escalation. Evidence of this would be present in discourse and the resulting 
outcomes. If the theory is to prove that it stands in the way of a resolution then there 
should be evidence that a hedge directly prevented a resolution from occurring, or that 
this was an unintended consequence of the strategy.  
2.3 Regional multilateralism  
Another possible theoretical take on the conflict in the South China Sea can be 
found in the school of liberalism, and multilateralism in particular. Furthermore, it is said 
by some scholars, Michael Beeson in particular, that in this case Asia’s turn to 
multilateralism cannot be separated from its turn to regionalism (Beeson, 2003)7. As 
such, only the two combined contribute to a better understanding of not only why parties 
chose ASEAN as their preferred forum to work it, but it will also explain this has not yet 
resulted in a resolution or why there has been no escalation since their commitment to 
ASEAN. 
 
7 For some notable examples see: Baldwin, Richard E. “Managing the Noodle Bowl: The Fragility of East 
Asian; Regionalism.” The Singapore Economic Review 53, no. 3 (2008): 449–478.; Haggard, S. “Regionalism in 
Asia and the Americas.” In The Political Economy of Regionalism, by E. D. Mansfield and H.V. Milner, 20-49. 
New York: Columbia University Press, 1997.; Ravenhill, John. “The ‘new East Asian regionalism’: A 
political domino effect.” Review of International Political Economy, 2010: 1-31.; Ravenhill, John. “East Asian 
regionalism: Much Ado about Nothing?” Review of International Studies 35 (2009): 215–235.; Ruland, Jurgen. 
“Southeast Asian Regionalism and Global Governance: “Multilateral Utility” or “Hedging Utility”?” 
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 2011: 83-112.; Thayer, Carlyle A. “Recent developments in the South China sea 
: grounds for cautious optimism?” RSIS Commentary, 2010: 1-51. 
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2.3.1 Asian Regionalism 
While the economic and political manifestations of integration are most manifest 
in the European Union (EU), greater integration and cooperation at a regional level has 
become a characteristic of contemporary transnational relations in Asia as well (Beeson, 
2003). Asian states have increasingly been turning to a regional solution under the 
auspices of ASEAN and ASEAN Plus Three8.  
The proliferation of regional economic agreements as well as engagement in 
regional institutions is usually explained by reference to economic factors. Often these 
agreements have been viewed either as a response to the costs and potential benefits of 
increasing interdependence. Interestingly this increased regional cooperation is not a 
consequence of economics per se. As Ravenhill states, rather than there being an 
‘economic domino’ effect at work, the new Asian regionalism is best understood as being 
driven by a ‘political domino’ effect (Ravenhill, 2010). 
The relevance of these functionalist accounts of regionalism for East Asia has 
long been questioned. It used to be the case that the notable absence of formal 
intergovernmental collaboration had to be explained because it occurred despite the 
substantial increase in economic interactions among states. Essentially, Asia, and 
particularly East Asia had experienced regionalization without regionalism (Ravenhill, 
2010). Stephan Haggard has provided one of the most sophisticated accounts: “greater 
economic interdependence in the region, simply had not created the collaboration and 
coordination of problems that would have led to a demand for regional institutions 
(Haggard, 1997). Yet eventually the demand for a regional institution grew and 
organizations such as ASEAN (and later ASEAN Plus Three) were established. These 
institutions do not go unused, much unlike their predecessors (Ravenhill, 2009). 
According to Ravenhill the logical consequence is that both the political as well as 
economical domino bring these Asian nations closer together and stimulate cooperation 
both regionally and multilaterally (Ruland, 2011).  
But perhaps there is one more factor to consider outside of stronger economical 
and political bonds. Amitav Acharya suggests that also mutual norm acceptation may 
play a role. Substantive research into this concept is relatively new, it finds its origins in 
the 20th century. The first wave of scholarship on normative change speaks to a moral 
 
8 ASEAN plus three is the forum that includes all ASEAN parties plus China, Japan, and South Korea. 
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cosmopolitanism (Risse, Ropp, & Sikkink, 1999). Its main features are firstly, the norms 
that are being propagated are "cosmopolitan," or "universal" norms (such as the 
campaign against land mines, struggle against racism, and so on); secondly, the key 
actors that spread these norms are transnational agents, (though they can be individual 
"moral entrepreneurs" or social movements) (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 483); lastly, despite 
recognizing the role of persuasion in norm diffusion, the literature tends to focus strongly 
on what Nadelmann calls "moral proselytism," which is concerned with conversion 
rather than contestation (Nadelmann, 1990, p. 481). 
 In assessing norm acceptation, scholars like Michael Barnett and Martha 
Finnemore find that the cosmopolitanist view downplays the agency role of local actors, 
thereby overemphasizing the teaching of transnational agents (Barnett & Finnemore, 
1999). Norm dynamics in world politics focuses on principled ideas, which establishes a 
fundamental distinction between what is good and what is evil. However, norm diffusion 
in international politics involves other kinds of ideas as well. For example, "prescriptive 
norms", these are norms that combine moral principles with considerations of efficiency 
and utility (Barnett & Finnemore, 1999, p. 251). In such cases, norm dynamics are 
shaped by different conditions and processes, with greater scope for the role of agency, 
essentially being voluntary initiative and selection of norm-takers (Acharya, How Ideas 
Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian 
Regionalism, 2004). Another perspective on norm diffusion goes beyond international 
prescriptions. As Jeffrey Checkel describes it, this perspective stresses the role of domestic 
political, organizational, and cultural variables in conditioning the reception of new 
global norms (Checkel, Why Comply? Social Learning and European Identity Change, 
2001). At its cores lies the notion that "congruence" best describes the fit between 
international and domestic norms, rather than "the degree of fit between two, competing 
international norms (Florini, 1996).  
In other words, there is a variety of ways in which norms can be accepted. The 
process by which this is done can take various forms, while international actors can do 
this by imposing their decisions on those they represent, also domestic actors (political 
and otherwise) can call for the acceptation of norms. The fastest way is if there is what 
Checkel calls a “cultural match," (Checkel, 1998) This cultural match describes "a 
situation where the prescriptions embodied in an international norm are convergent with 
domestic norms, as reflected in discourse, the legal system (constitutions, judicial codes, 
laws), and bureaucratic agencies (organizational ethos and administrative agencies)." 
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(Checkel, 1998, p. 4) Essentially, Norm diffusion is "more rapid when… asystemic 
norm... resonates with historically constructed domestic norms.” (Checkel, 1998, p. 6) 
Amitav Acharya, by using this idea of norm diffusion, notes that this was also a 
major consideration in the choice to work within more regional organizations like 
ASEAN and the different varieties thereof (Acharya, How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms 
Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism, 2004, p. 
269). Admittedly, it is easier to find norm acceptation within a region that shares some 
cultural similarities. Interestingly, Acharya immediately takes the step from 
regionalization to multilateralism. 
2.3.2. Multilateralism 
So why seek multilateral solutions to conflicts? Particular for Asian states that 
highly emphasize sovereignty, this does not always appear to be the most logical 
solution. However, as Lisa Martin has proposed, multilateralism can sometimes be a 
solution to dilemmas of strategic interaction (Martin, 1992). She argues that while a 
series of bilateral interactions could provide a solution, these are often considered too 
lengthy and tedious. What is more, the wide variety of multilateral organizations offer 
states the option of choosing one that least infringes on its sovereignty and limit the 
interference of unrelated parties (Martin, 1992, p. 791). 
While there are a great variety of organizations, they vary in their contribution to 
multilateralism (Ruland, 2011). Moreover, their functionality may also vary. Slow 
decision-making can be but one of the characteristics of these multilateral institutions 
(Rittberger & Zangl, 2006). Particularly the larger the group of nations involved, the 
more difficult it is to come to a decision. Yet, in spite of this slow decision-making these 
institutions contribute to peace and security, as this is partly why states agree to give up 
part of their sovereignty. This is of course especially the case in the United Nations (UN) 
(Newman, 2007). Moreover, when states are truly committed to resolving their dispute in 
this multilateral framework, they are unlikely to escalate the situation (Newman, 2007). 
Hence, working multilaterally within an organization of choice, will both promote and 
constrain decision-making.  
Accepting Asian regionalism and noting that Asian states increasingly act 
multilaterally in a great variety of regional international organizations like Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), ASEAN, ASEAN Plus Three, the ARF, and the Asian 
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Summit. Considering that all parties to the South China Sea dispute are committed to 
solving the conflict within the framework of ASEAN and the ARF it may well be that 
this regional multilateralism causes the perpetuation of the conflict as multilateral 
decision-making is traditionally very slow (Newman, 2007). Moreover, as Newman 
points out, states traditionally are not quick to escalate a conflict; they are committed to 
solving multilaterally. Hence further research has to show whether perpetuation of low 
intensity conflict is best explained by Asian (regional) multilateralism.  
2.3.3. Hypothesis 
From this we can conclude that regional multilateralism limits states in their 
possible actions but also facilitates interaction in other areas. If regional multilateralism 
were to explain both the absence of escalation and the absence of a resolution then this 
would be evident from any of the constraints and opportunities that are given by the 
chosen multilateral framework. In the case of the absence of an escalation there should 
be evidence that from the moment the parties committed themselves to a multilateral 
framework the stability in the region increased. At the same time there could be evidence 
in discourse that states chose not to escalate because of the risk of jeopardizing the 
process of finding a resolution in the chosen multilateral framework. Evidence that 
regional multilateralism is the cause for the absence of a resolution. 
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3. The Middle Kingdom 
As the biggest party in the dispute over the South China Sea, China can certainly 
be considered a key player. Some even go so far as to suggest that if China chooses to 
end the conflict, the other parties would follow suit (Triggs, 2009, p. 2). While this sells 
other parties short, especially other major players like Vietnam and the Philippines; there 
is some truth to the idea. As China has the most elaborate claim, and therefore has a 
disagreement with every single party, hence it is in the best position to reduce the number 
disputes. What is more, China has a vested interest in more stability in the region as it 
considers it distraction from its priority, maintaining domestic stability (Bateman & 
Emmers, 2008). The questions that are sub sequentially raised is why China, given the 
fact that a solution could have provided more stability, has neither escalated the situation 
nor has made a serious attempt at a resolution? The way this will be explored is through 
the model of processual constructivism. It is hypothesized that if this model is a valid 
explanation for the absence of escalation and a resolution, then there will be a 
perceivable impact of identity and the formation of identity on the Chinese foreign policy 
that guides these events  
3.1. Relations with its neighbors 
The way the Chinese perceive themselves and are perceived by others has 
traditionally mattered a great deal Chinese rules /governments, and citizens alike. It is 
not for nothing that it is called the ‘Middle Kingdom’. Past and current rules and 
governments have stressed China’s greatness to its people. History books are filled with 
China’s long and rich history and culture. This is also that the Chinese government loves 
to stress to other nations. For example the Chinese ambassador to South Africa has been 
quoted at a South African banquest saying that : “Admiral Zheng took to the places he 
visited [in Africa] tea, chinaware, silk and technology. He did not occupy an inch of 
foreign land, nor did he take a single slave. What he brought to the outside world was 
peace and civilization. This fully reflects the good faith of the ancient Chinese people. 
This peace-loving culture has taken deep root in the minds and hearts of Chinese people 
of all generations” (Alden, 2007, p. 19). History even played a great part throught all the 
Summer Olympics of 2008, being present in the various ceremonies and in other 
symbolism (Qing, Chen, Colapinto, Akihiko, Yun'il, & Miikoe, 2010, p. 1420).  
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The importance of identity and the presence in Chinese foreign policy can been 
seen in the relationships with its neighboring states, particullarly those in Southeast Asia, 
states with whom China had set up tributary relationships (Gries, Zhang, Masui, & Lee, 
2009) In the past, the hierarchical regional order relied on the cultural prominence of 
Confucianism, the disparity in economic and military strength, and the long-standing 
influences of the tribute system. These all favored the centrality and comparative 
economic prowess of China (Kang, 2010). The arrangement was beneficial to China 
because it would legitimize the ruler and government in place (Shu, 2012), Southeast 
Asian states in turn received legitimacy for their respective government and used it to 
regulated the balance of power in the region (Ren, 2011). 
While the original tributary system no longer exists, remnants continue to 
influence Chinese foreign policy. As Zhou Fangyin points out, this is recognizable in the 
two way character of traditional Chinese diplomacy. China has a vested interest in 
stabilizing its relationships with neighbors, and does so through making concessions. 
These in turn are sold publically as win-win deals (Womack, 2012) 
3.2. Gradations of identity  
This continued presence of hierarchy in Chinese foreign relations is the product 
of Chinese identity formation. China once saw itself as the center of the world and it is 
wide suggested that it may once more become the great power it was in the past. Yet, it 
seems as though for every believer in the great rise of China there is also a skeptic9. There 
is even a variety of ‘how to’ books published in China on how to become a great power10. 
The same holds for foreign scholars and journalists but also for their Chinese 
counterparts. It is of no surprise then that there are nearly equally many opinions on how 
Chinese foreign policy should be conducted.  
David Shambaugh has tried to make sense of the often diverse and contradictory 
emphases of Chinese foreign policy. He notes that Chinese identity discourse has laid 
bare the conflicting identities that exit in the Chinese worldview as well as conflicting 
 
9 One of the well known China skeptics is Minxin Pei, in his 2009 article in foreign policy titled “Think Again: 
Asia's Rise” in which Pei gives an interesting overview of the believers in China’s rise and those that support 
his argument that China is still a far cry away from becoming a dominant power.  
10 See for example, Xue Yong (), Zenmeyang Zuo Daguo () [How to be a great power], 
Beijing: Zhongguo Chubanshe (), 2009.; and Yu Defu (
), Daguo Faze () The 
Rules for Great Nations], Beijing: Zhongguo Chubanshe (), 2009 
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perspectives on the role that China should play in the world (Shambaugh, Coping with a 
Conflicted China, 2011). These conflicting perspectives have lead to what has been 
described as a ‘schizophrenic’ foreign policy (Kleine-Alhbrandt, 2012). Essentially, this is 
what Shambaugh calls the consequence of competing international identities, elements of 
which Chinese foreign policy tries to reflect simultaneously (Shambaugh, 2011). A good 
example can be found in a recent confrontation between China and the Philippines in the 
beginning of 2012. China and the Philippines have a disagreement concerning fishing 
jurisdiction and have had several confrontations about this dispute since 2011. At the 
beginning of 2012 the Chinese accused Philippine fishermen of harassing Chinese 
collegues and the press widely published that China was considering military steps 
(Xinhua, 2012). At the same time however, Chinese diplomats were working overtime 
informing relevant embassies in Beijing that this was not the government’s intention 
(Kleine-Alhbrandt, 2012). A few weeks later the presses led with a story that China was 
advocating a peaceful resolution (Esplanada, 2012). Another good example can be found 
in the policy of “daguo shi guanjian, zhoubian shi shouyao, fazhanzhong guojia shi jichu, 
duobian shi zhongyao wutai”, which translates as “major powers are the key, surrounding 
areas are the first priority, developing countries are the foundation, and multilateral 
forums are the important stage” (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 9). Shambaugh uses this example 
for what he calls the ‘spectrum of Chinese global identities’. These identities are 
essentially seven different perspectives on foreign policy, which range from isolationist 
tendencies to full engagement in global governance and institutions. Between those two 
extremes five other perspectives follow the thought process of more realist to more 
liberalist orientations (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 10).  
 
Figure 1: Spectrum of Chinese Identities (Shambaugh, 2011) 
The far left group of Nativists is made up of populists, xenophobic nationalists, 
and Marxists. This isolationist school distrusts international institutions. It vociferously 
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criticizes the West, and the US in particular. Its main proponents are found in the 
Central Committee of the Communist Part (in particular those involved with Communist 
Party history and ideology), and they are found in the Marxism Academy of the Chinese 
think tank ‘Chinese Academy of Social Sciences’ (better known under its acronym 
CASS). This group would sooner look to developing countries and particularly its 
neighboring countries (with the exception of those under American influence like Japan). 
This cluster contains hyper nationalistic elements whose main focus is anti-imperialism 
(Shambaugh, 2011, p. 11).  
The second school is called Realists with Chinese characteristics. This group is 
most dominant in the discourse on China’s global role today. Realism has deep roots in 
Chinese society, even during the socialist era (Johnson, 1998). For this group, it is state 
sovereignty that is most valuable of all. The group has four possible sub-divisions: 
offensive, defensive, hard and soft. Each of the subgroups agrees that the state is 
responsible for building its own strength but they differ in views on how that strength 
should be used. The hard power group argues for strengthening comprehensive power, 
like the military and the economy. Soft power advocates would instead emphasize 
diplomacy and cultural power. The group of offensive realists would actively use this 
power because without exercising it they argue it would be worthless. Coercion of other 
states to suit China’s needs would not be out of the question for them. The defensive 
realists instead feel, while strong military might is important, it would serve much better 
if used as a deterrent (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 12). A well-known member of this group is 
Shen Dingli, Dean of the School of International Studies ad Shanghai’s Fudan 
University. Shen, like fellow scholar Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University finds that the 
peaceful rise theory is dangerous because it speaks of peace and pacifism and dilutes the 
credibility of military threats (Yan, 2004). Other realists are found in the People’s 
Liberation Army (PLA), whose existence is strongly linked to China’s defense policy 
(Xinhua, 2012).  
The third school is named the ‘Major Powers’ school. Those affiliated with it 
propose Chinese diplomacy focus on managing its relations with major powers and 
powerblocks like the US, Russia and even the EU (though this last group certainly 
decreased in relevance over the past years due to disorganization in Brussels). This group 
argues China cannot have good regional relationships if it not also has decent 
relationships with these major powers. Not having them would be detrimental to Chinese 
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interests. Main proponents of the school are found in American studies departments 
(Shambaugh, 2011, p. 14). 
At the middle spectrum we find a school that argues for concentrating China’s 
diplomacy on its immediate periphery and Asian Neighborhood. This group is named 
the Asia First school by Shambaugh. Members of this school believe that if China’s 
neighborhood is not stable, it could pose a major impediment to China’s overall 
development and to national security in particular (Shambaugh, 2005). The school 
initially made an impact during the Asian financial crisis in 1997. Three years later in 
2000 its members were very active in the ‘peace and development debate’. During both 
instances they emphasized the importance of China’s neighborhood diplomacy (zhoubian 
waijiao) (Shi, 2001). While this relationship has been strained as of 2009 due to the 
belligerent tone of China’s neighbors, there are still those that push for ‘multilateral 
regionalism’. These individuals are what Shambaugh calls Constructivists with Chinese 
Characteristics. Examples are Professor Qin Yaqing of China Foreign Affairs University 
and Zhang Yunling of CASS (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 16).  
Another step to the right of the Asia First school there is the Global South 
School. This school finds that China’s has a longstanding self-identification with the 
developing world and hence has a responsibility to make it a priority in its foreign policy. 
There is however some debate to which developing countries China has the greatest 
responsibility11. Advocates of this school are also staunch advocates of the Brazil, Russia, 
India, China (BRIC) group (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 17). 
The penultimate school is that of Selective Multilateralism. This school finds that 
China ought to gradually expand its global involvement. However, it feels it should do so 
selective and only so far as it impacts national security. Opinions in the group are 
however divided on the specifics of which commitments to make (for example only UN 
mandated activities). The creed of this school is ‘fuzeren de daguo’, being a responsible 
international stakeholder. The Selective Multilateralism school varies from the school of 
Globalism by caring more about equality of participation than about governance. For 
this reason they also favor multipolarity and bilateralism over true multilateralism. 
 
11 While China used to speak of Northern and Southern developing countries it has since made a 
categorization into three groups: (1) newly industrialized economies like Brazil and South Africa, (2) average 
income developing countries like Mexico and Thailand, and (3) least developed countries as found in Sub-
Saharan African and South Asia (Alden, 2007). 
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According to this school multilateralism is sooner a tool than an intergovernmental 
mechanism.  
Finally, the last school of Globalism goes furthest in its commitment to the 
international arena. The official Chinese view on global governance is as stated by 
foreign minister Yang Jiechi:  
“A more developed China will undertake more international responsibilities and will never 
pursue interests at the expense of others. We know full well that in this interdependent world, 
China’s future is closely linked to that of the world. Our own interests and those of others are best 
served when we work together to expand common interests, share responsibilities, and seek win-win 
outcomes. This is why while focusing on its own development, China is undertaking more and more 
international responsibilities commensurate with its strength and status.” (Yang, 2010, p. 3) 
While in discourse China advocates larger responsibilities in the international 
arena, this school is still regarded as eclectic. They focus on non-traditional security and 
are very strong advocates of the UN. While once growing in importance this school has 
since 2009 been eclipsed by those in the ministry of foreign affairs and those in academics 
as the distrust of global governance has been rising (Shambaugh, 2011, p. 21). 
On any topic there is a multiplicity of identities present in the discourse, though 
which ones vary per topic and the stakeholders involved with it. Shambaugh was not the 
only one to notice, in a recent report of the International Crisis Group (ICG) on the 
South China Sea they also point out that the variety of stakeholders involved and their 
importance causes Chinese foreign policy to be antithetical at times (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p. 8). 
3.3. Nine dragons stirring up the sea 
In the formation of foreign policy domestic actors, other than the ministry of 
foreign affairs, have been very prolific. The complicated bureaucratic structure behind the 
management of the conflict in the South China Sea has been described in China as ‘
’ (Jiulong nao hai), ‘Nine dragons stirring up the sea’, which is the title of an old 
Chinese legend. The actors in the South China Sea however exceed this myth. The 
substantial Chinese bureaucracy includes eleven actors at the ministerial level if the 
enforcement agencies are counted as separated actors (International Crisis Group, 2012, 
p. 8). The most important nine dragons, according to Chen Wei, a scholar with the 
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public security ministry, include (1) the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), (2) 
Customs Law Enforcement (part of the General Administration of Customs), (3) China 
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (part of the agriculture ministry), (4) Marine 
Safety Administration (part of transport ministry), (5) Search and Rescue Centre (part of 
the transport ministry), (6) Maritime Police (part of public security ministry), (7) Border 
police (part of public security ministry), (8) China Marine Surveillance (part of State 
Oceanic Administration), and (9) Maritime environmental protection (Chen W. , 2011). 
The ICG has made an organigramme of the key actors involved. 
 
Figure 2: Key Actors in the SCS (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.32) 
Some even argue more actors should be considered. Whatever the number of 
actors, looking at the organigramme it suffices to say when this many actors are involved 
and have a vested interest, it is likely a proverbial ‘too many cooks in the kitchen’ 
situation that might occur.  
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3.3.1 Stakeholders and foreign policymaking 
Whether this situation would occur depends on the level of influence each of the 
actors exerts. The most active of the actors include the Bureau of Fisheries 
Administration, China Marine Surveillance, the local governments, the PLAN, the 
foreign ministry, and energy companies.  
3.3.1.1. Bureau of fisheries administration 
The bureau of fisheries administration of the agricultural ministry is responsible 
for one of the two largest law enforcement agencies dealing with China’s claimed 
maritime territory, namely, the China Fisheries Law Enforcement Command12. The 
agency is responsible for regulation the domestic fishing industry; safeguarding fishing 
vessels, rocks and reefs claimed by China; and, protecting claimed regions from foreign 
vessels from fishing there (even enforce expulsion if necessary) (International Crisis 
Group, 2012, p. 8). Aside from its formal tasks it is also custom that the government 
sends it to safeguard disputed areas such as the Mischief Reef (Nanfang Zhoumo, 2010). 
The Fisheries Law Enforcement Command used to be a provincial level administration 
directly under the State Council and the Central Military Commission but was absorbed 
into the agriculture ministry in 1984 (Fisheries Administration, 2012). It is important 
here to note that the State Council is the highest administrative body and the Central 
Military Commission is the highest military authority, roughly equivalent to the State 
Council. This means that during the first incident with South Vietnam in 1974, the 
Fisheries Law Enforcement Command was a direct extension of the military and under 
the immediate command of one of the highest bodies of government. The rhetoric and 
actions of both parties fall into the realist school of Shambaugh. They advocated strong 
use of China’s military superiority to that of South Vietnam. What was more, they saw 
little use in taking extra efforts for a diplomatic solution, after all, South Vietnam was not 
nearly as powerful at China (Samuels, 1984, p. 101).  
3.3.1.2 China marine surveillance  
Another active actor in the conflict is the China Marine Surveillance, which is 
under the command of the State Oceanic Administration, and is the second most active 
maritime law enforcement force. Its key role is to defend sovereignty over claimed waters 
 
12 The other being the ‘China Marine Surveillance’ under the command of the State Oceanic Administration.  
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in the South China Sea13. The State Oceanic Administration spent many of its early years 
dealing with domestic misuse of the South China Sea. In 2001, it defended China’s 
sovereignty, and declared defending disputed areas on the sea another priority (State 
Oceanic Administration, 2009). It has started to regularly patrol China’s claimed waters, 
including the South China Sea since 2008 and has been the major player in several 
serious incidents with Vietnam since 2009 (State Oceanic Administration, 2009, p. 478).  
3.3.1.3 Local governments 
Local governments also have a large stake in the territory in the South China Sea. 
The provinces of Hainan, Guangdong, and Guangxi all have a coastline along the South 
China Sea, which serves as a key area of growth in their economic plans. Their emphasis 
is on GDP growth as this is the most important criteria for advancement in the political 
system other than inherited family power. Hence, these provinces are very eager to 
expand their economic activities such as fishery and tourism. On several occasions their 
aggressive pursuit of these industries led to confrontations with Vietnam and the 
Philippines (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 10). Unlike central government, local 
governments have had a far more antagonistic stance to other claimant states. Their 
rhetoric placed and places a large emphasis on China’s historical claim to the Spratly and 
the Paracels (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 27). Furthermore, they, like the bureau 
of fisheries administration, emphasize the necessity of China to project its power, 
particularly as its fleet has been gaining in strength (Emmers, 2010, p. 71) 
3.3.1.4 People’s Liberation Army Navy 
Despite rapid expansion of the PLAN’s presence in the South China Sea, its has 
so far played a secondary role in managing disputes in the South China Sea. While the 
navy’s role traditionally has been defined as a protector of China’s maritime sovereignty, 
it has not engaged in any incidents in the South China Sea with other claimants since 
2005 even though it has been regularly patrolling the area (Swaine & Fravel, 2010, p. 6). 
While the PLAN is informed when incidents happen its vessels tend to either stay in the 
background or arrive late, allowing civilian law enforcement or paramilitary agencies to 
handle the issues instead (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 10). The intervening of 
civil agencies gives the government a diplomatic ‘out’ should things go awry, it would 
then be the fault of local, not central government. This however also presented a 
 
13 Other tasks include environmental protection and preventing various misuses of the sea. For a full 
overview see China’s Ocean Development Report of 2011 at page 480.  
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problem, due to the build of military, and diversification of military tasks to local 
government, fear and mistrust grew in neighboring countries. Interestingly though, until 
recently, the PLAN’s South China Sea fleet was the weakest fleet China had. This 
indicates the discrepancy between the PLA’s intentions and that from the relevant 
ministries. Interestingly, there is even a large discrepancy within the PLA as to what 
course of action China should take. While there are those of the offensive hard power 
realist school persuasion and the soft and defensive variations, there are also those that 
favor the Selective Multilateralism School. To name two examples, some in the PLA 
would support partaking in UN mandates action while others abhor even the suggestion. 
Then there are those that argue that in the face of persistent tensions in the area 
increasing military capabilities would be warranted as a source of deterrence 
(International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 11). Another common realist argument for a 
stronger navy is that the South China Sea’s has risen in strategic significance as China’s 
export-orientated economy has become increasingly dependent on maritime transport (Li 
N. , 2010, p. 37). 
Interestingly, these demands for assertiveness, while not necessarily 
representative of the views of the entire PLA leadership, come largely from PLA 
personnel outside the military’s central hierarchy. While having little effect on overall 
policy, it has managed to inflame nationalist public sentiment (Forsythe, 2012). Through 
this interaction each party shapes its idea of China and how it should behave.  
3.3.1.5. Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
The only agency that is experienced in handling diplomatic affairs and 
authorized to negotiate with neighboring countries over the South China Sea disputes is 
the foreign ministry. It is charged with the task of providing policy guidance and tracking 
other agencies’ activities in disputed areas to prevent / preempt international incidents. 
Although the ministry of foreign affairs is theoretically responsible for the formulation 
and execution of Chinese foreign policy, its leadership role, responsibility and authority 
on most foreign policy issues of strategic significance has been largely reduced and 
bypassed by other more powerful players (Lampton, 2001). The ministry is also 
hampered in its task due to a lack of legal clarity, nationalist public sentiment, and the 
presence of various internal departments with overlapping responsibilities when it comes 
to South China Sea issues (Lampton, 2001). As a result, the ministry struggles to wield 
and maintain influence over other agencies, which puts it in a complicated situation in 
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general but particularly when there is an escalating situation. The ICG has made another 
insightful organigramme of actors involved in foreign policymaking.  
 
Figure 3: Foreign Policy Actors (International Crisis Group, 2012, p.42) 
 
What the organigramme however does not indicate is the level of influence 
exerted over the actual foreign policy, nor does it indicate the relevance of the ministry of 
foreign affairs. The role of the ministry is to formally advise and coordinate the many 
actors involved in the South China Sea but almost all of the important actors are equal or 
superior in rank to the ministry. What is more, none of the agencies have much respect 
for the advice or take kindly to it (Kleine-Alhbrandt, 2012). Another reason why the 
ministry is not considered to be of high importance is because domestic issues carry far 
greater priority than do foreign issues. Those that manage domestic policy find 
themselves far further down Shambaugh’s scale, some happily contend that those are 
issues China should not concern itself with, or only to a very small degree (International 
Crisis Group, 2012, p. 15). Also the PLA outranks the ministry and has so little regard 
for it, it does not even report all of its activities to the Politburo, let alone communicate 
properly with the ministry. The ICG has even reported that the ministry sometimes relies 
on information of foreign embassies in and outside of China to know what the PLA is up 
to (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 15). While since early 2000 the ministry has had 
little to say in the CCP, this was not always the case. From 1988 to 1998, Qian Qichen 
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simultaneously held the positions of Chinese foreign minister and State Council vice 
premier. Currently, State Councilor Dai Bingguo, who is regarded as the highest-ranking 
foreign policy official in China, is not even a member of the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP)’s 25-strong Politburo. In an interview the ICG held in 2010 a Chinese analyst put 
it this way: “Yang Jiechi [China’s current foreign minister], isn’t even as powerful as 
[State Councilor] Dai Bingguo’s assistant” (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 16).  
With so many conflicting opinions it is not strange that there was and is a great 
variation in what each person and department feels which approach China should take. 
While under Qian Qichen China was more on the offensive, under Yang Jiechi China is 
far more to the right of Shambaugh’s spectrum.  
3.3.1.6. Energy Companies 
Energy companies are another interesting group involved with the South China 
Sea Dispute. These enterprises are among the most important quasi-governmental actors 
in Chinese South China Sea policy. The major stakeholders include China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), China Petrochemical Corporation (Sinopec) and China 
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). So far, the interest of Chinese oil 
companies in exploiting oil reserves in the waters around the disputed areas has been 
limited, due to the political sensitivity of the South China Sea issue, technical and 
financial concerns, and even the feasibility of such operations. Nevertheless, these 
companies were very active during the 70’ and 80’ when Shell first discovered that there 
might be oil reserves in the South China Sea. After this time, concerns grew whether 
exploitation would be possible at a profitable level. It has since become clear that the 
South China Sea holds most importance for fishery opportunities (Emmers, 2010, p. 79). 
3.3.2. Conflicting identities 
Taking all the various stakeholders into consideration as well as those involved in 
foreign policymaking, there are a lot of different views and perceptions involved. These 
also change during interaction with other states. As such, it is very difficult to develop a 
singular clear foreign policy, something that is far easier to achieve in different political 
systems. The Chinese system as such is more susceptible to competing identities shaping 
its policy as a consequence of which it becomes confusing to the outside world. When 
the ministry of foreign affairs, deemed to be responsible for China’s foreign policy, says 
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one thing and it has to learn from another country the PLA says and otherwise, it 
becomes difficult for other countries to respond.  
During the 1974, when it came to military confrontation South Vietnam, there 
were fewer competing voices emanating from China. Perhaps this was helped by the 
stronger polarized nature of world politics. Communist China was faced dealing with a 
capitalist and previously foreign controlled South Vietnam, this made China’s way of 
approaching the situation fairly straightforward because there was much more agreement 
on how China should react. South Vietnam claimed islands that China suspected could 
be used by the Russians in a later stage. Those responsible for the attack in the Paracels 
were Mao Zedong (heading the CMC), Zhou Enlai (minister of defence and vice 
chairman of the CMC), and the recently rehabilitated Deng Xiaoping. They are believed 
to have been in agreement that China ought to pre-empt Russia from using the islands 
against them. As such, all those responsible were in agreement as to what actions to take 
(Garver, 1992, p. 18).  
While relations had been improving since 1980, in 1988 reunified Vietnam and 
China came to blows again (however briefly) when Vietnam heard China had the 
intention of building a Marine observation station on the Spratly Islands that were also 
claimed by Vietnam. Vietnam sent heavily armed soldiers to the islands to plant 
Vietnamese flags that were sub-sequentially removed by Chinese soldiers arriving an 
hour later. This prompted a confrontation with shots exchanged. The Chinese won with 
overwhelming force sinking two Vietnamese vessels, severely damaging another, and 
killing 70 Vietnamese soldiers. The Vietnamese had only succeeded in wounding one 
Chinese soldier (Cheng & Tien, 2000, p. 264). China is at this point staking its claim and 
starting to send out messages that it is a force to be reckoned with. This becomes more 
evident as it distributes a map in 1992 stating that it considers the whole South China Sea 
to be its territory. Tensions accumulate as China almost comes to blows with the 
Philippines in 1995 over a construction in the Mischief Reef. Interestingly it is believed 
that the order for construction was given not by civilian leadership but by the PLA. This 
seems plausible as the government was already taking a more conciliatory stance (Guan, 
2000, p. 11). The Philippines even had proof of PLA engaging in smuggling and piracy in 
the territory (Story, 1999). They argued that PLA leadership must have known and 
condoned such actions. During this time the Chinese government was already working 
on a joint development plan with the Philippines and Vietnam. A year later in 1996 
China signs the Law of the Sea Convention (UNCLOS). Jiang Zemin, minister in charge 
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of foreign affairs, was said to be in a battle with the PLA over the nations policy in the 
South China Sea (Guan, 2000). 
With the coming of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 relations amongst Asian 
nations are cemented. In China the Asia First school dominates and much progress is 
made within the ASEAN framework to come to a more manageable situation. By 2000 a 
few territorial disagreements in the Golf of Tonkin are settled and in 2002 ASEAN 
comes to an agreement on the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties on the South 
China Sea’, which sets the stage for possible commercial cooperation and long-term 
stability (Guan, 2000). Later, in 2005 oil companies from China, Vietnam and the 
Philippines sign a deal to jointly protect oil and gas resources in the South China Sea 
(P.R.C. MFA, 2005). 
3.3.3. Identities, interests and consequences 
Identities are however not the only thing that conflict in China. It also has a 
number of interests that may conflict with each other as well. In the most general sense, 
China’s highest priorities are maintaining internal stability and securing continued 
economic growth. More specifically to the South China Sea China wants to claim all the 
territory as contained in its nine dotted line, it wants to be on friendly terms with its 
neighbors and it wants to secure external security in the South China Sea (Kaplan, 2011, 
p. 2). While these interests are not mutually exclusive they are not all compatible either. 
First and foremost China wants internal stability, as evidenced by the power of the 
ministry of internal affairs, but this is difficult to achieve if there is no external stability. If 
China has to pay attention to a tense situation just beyond its borders then less energy 
can be put into internal security. Also economic growth, another high priority, is difficult 
to achieve if there is a conflict concerning major transit routes. At the same time, it has in 
its domestic discourse often stressed the historic claim to the territory in the South China 
Sea, causing the Chinese people to consider it a matter of national pride (Bosworth, 2011, 
p. 11). 
These competing interest and identities cause China to be unable and perhaps 
even unwilling to reach a resolution to the conflict. If it forces a solution it will aggravate 
its neighbors and potentially even unleash armed conflict destabilizing the region. 
However, if it gives in on too many fronts many factions and citizens will be upset, 
potentially destabilizing government. Hence, the absence of a singular national identity 
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causes China to be unable to move forward. If the entire country were to support a more 
pacifist and responsible China, it would be easier to reach a consensus that could be 
explained domestically. As such, these competing identities explain the absence of a 
resolution  
While there is a consensus that China may use force when attacked, the opinion 
is greatly divided whether an aggressive (perhaps even U.S.-like) demeanor is befitting of 
China. At the same time, the ever-present debate on China’s identity has kept more 
hawkish actors like the PLA in check (Bosworth, 2011, p. 10). As such, it has gone far in 
preventing escalation. However, this is becoming increasingly difficult. With individual 
actors gaining more autonomy over time, central government is very slowly losing 
control over the separate components. It used to be beneficial to the government to give 
more autonomy to for instance its local governments; this allowed them to manage their 
own crises and the government not taking all the blame if things went wrong. Over time, 
provinces like Hainan have been using their powers more frequently, for instance to 
unilaterally start tourism to the disputed islands (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 21). 
This has a huge potential for creating conflict and so central government struggles to 
regain its grip. This situation does not bode well for future relations and stability in the 
region.  
 Though processual constructivism explains the Chinese motivations well 
it does not explain the reactions of China’s neighbors. It has been suggested that these 
may be best explained by hedging strategies (Hernandez, 2011)  
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4. Vietnam and the Philippines 
There are a great number of countries claiming various parts of the South China 
Sea. In total there are nine countries14 with claims to the territory, all various in size and 
grounds upon which they are claimed. To display them all on a map would create what 
China calls a noodlebowl, an incomprehensible jumble of lines with no distinguishable 
beginning or end (Baldwin, 2008, p. 451). 
To give an impression, the United States 
Energy Information Administration 
(USEIA) has drawn a map indicating the 
various claims of the largest claimants. 
Out of all these claimants, Vietnam and 
the Philippines have again the largest 
claims. As a consequence they often 
found and find themselves in conflict with 
China, the largest claimant by far. Out of 
all the states, Vietnam and the Philippines 
are the states that have not only frequently 
found themselves on the verve but also in 
actual armed conflict. There have been a 
few instances that stood out: (1) the 1974 military confrontation between China and 
South Vietnam, (2) the 1988 military confrontation between Reunified Vietnam and 
China, and (3) the 1995 and 1999 run-in over the Mischief Reef between China and the 
Philippines. This is not to say that there have not been any other heated disagreements 
but these have by far been the most significant (International Crisis Group, 2012, p. 28).  
If hedging is to explain the causes of the absence of further disputes then this 
should be evident from the strategies chosen and the motivation hind them, explicit or 
not. These strategies may involve direct action or the express absence of action. The 
same would hold for the absence of a resolution, though it must be noted that this ought 
not to be the result of unintended consequences. 
  
 
14 Provided Taiwan be counted as a separate country 
Figure 4 Claimants Map (USEIA, 2008) 
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4.1 The 1974 confrontation on the Paracel Islands 
On January 19th of 1974 there was a military confrontation between South-
Vietnam and China, also named ‘the battle of the Paracel Islands’. Out of the two 
countries China was the first to claim ownership15. While North Vietnam supported 
China’s claim16, South Vietnam claimed the sovereignty of the islands on the basis of the 
prior French occupation and landed its forces on one of the Paracel Islands in 1973 
(Chen K. C., 1987). For some time the PLA took no action to displace the South 
Vietnamese forces, however, after the Army of the Republic of Vietnam’s (ARVN) forces 
was reduced to a single platoon due to the cutting of funds as dictated by the Paris Peace 
accords, the PLA moved in. In 1974 the South Vietnamese army discovered armored 
fishing trawlers in the area and found that other Chinese soldiers were installed in a 
nearby bunker. The South Vietnamese government then decided to dispatch several 
naval vessels to confront the Chinese fleet in the areas.  
What stood out was that there was no balance to the troops that were brought to 
the area. China’s did not nearly send its most capable PLAN troops. The reinforcements 
(in the form of fighter jets and a more capable frigate) came only later as a well-timed 
surprise. Early on the Chinese had the Vietnamese on the retreat due to superior 
material17 and eventually China won the battle. In the end the Vietnamese casualties 
were markedly higher (Chen K. C., 1987). Diplomatically, the power projection was of 
great benefit to China during a time of regional turmoil; it was also a humbling 
experience for the older superpowers, which pointedly refused to take sides in the matter 
from the very beginning (Lima, 1974).  
South Vietnam could have left the islands alone, though it was said that there 
were significant oil reserves, even by estimates of that time, the indications were that the 
reserves were very small. This leads to the question what motivation South Vietnam had 
for making it an issue. A feasible answer would be that it sought to balance against China 
 
15 Though there were others that claimed it earlier, like France. 
16 They released a statement saying: “We have the honour to bring to your knowledge that the Government 
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam recognizes and supports the declaration dated 4th September, 1958 
of the Government of China fixing the width of the Chinese territorial waters. The Government of the 
Democratic Republic of Vietnam respects this decision.” King C. Chen, (1987) "China's war with Vietnam: 
issues, decisions, and implications” New York: S Hoover Institution Press, p. 45 
17 It has even been suggested that the South Vietnamese material like vessels and radars were woefully 
inadequate for this kind of battle. King C. Chen, (1987) "China's war with Vietnam: issues, decisions, and 
implications” New York: S Hoover Institution Press, p. 40 
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and communism in particular (Lieberman, 2009). A hedge, in this case was to take 
action, even if it were unsuccessful. As a small state there is always the difficulty of when 
to yield and when to resist; it has to strike a balance so it does not get absorbed into either 
one sphere of influence or the other, in this case the US or China respectively. 
4.2. The 1988 confrontation in the Spratly Islands 
In 1988 there was another confrontation between China and then reunified South 
Vietnam, also known as the ‘Johnson South Reef Skirmish’ (Guan, 2000). 
In February of 1987 a global ‘sea-level joint observation plan’ was adopted by the 
UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (IOC). The Chinese 
government commissioned and observatory project. It requested the establishment of five 
marine observation stations, the first of which was to be located in the Yongshu Reef. To 
guarantee the security of the project China sent its South China Sea fleet to help 
securitization. Upon learning that China intended to build a marine observation station, 
the Vietnamese Navy began to intensify its occupation of the islands and reefs of Spratly 
Islands (where the Yongshu Reef is located). A few days later on the afternoon of 
February 18, the Chinese Navy and Vietnamese Navy rushed to land on Huayang reef at 
the same time, each planting a flag. Confrontation between the two sides lasted 3 hours 
and eventually the Vietnamese Navy was forced to retreat, due to inclement weather. 
Both sides had trouble with their military command but eventually China came out 
victorious (Cheng & Tien, 2000, p. 41). Interestingly, while the Vietnamese describe the 
situation as armed conflict the Chinese only consider it a situation in which shots were 
fired (Cheng & Tien, 2000, p. 43).   
More interesting than the conflict is its aftermath. China proceeded to construct 
its observation stations and the Vietnamese navy could not do anything to stop it. The 
Chinese for their part did nothing against the Vietnamese occupation of other islands and 
reefs, not even when they occupied surrounding reefs. China did nothing to intervene 
because it may have prompted a nearby Russian vessel to intervene, what was more, they 
did not want to risk possibly damaging airstrikes (Guan, 2000).  
This incident was the second overwhelming defeat for Vietnam (though the first 
as a reunified country), which raises the question why they were so adamant to claim the 
territory in spite of the possibility of facing defeat again. It has been argued that Vietnam 
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wanted to send a signal to the Chinese, essentially making a balancing effort. There was a 
feeling if they accepted all Chinese infringements on a territory they claimed as well, 
Vietnam would no longer be taken seriously (Cheng & Tien, 2000). 
4.3. The 1995 and 1999 run-in in the Mischief Reef 
In 1994 China had a similar encounter at the Mischief Reef, which was at that 
time inside the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 18 of the Philippines. China had built 
initial structures on stilts there while the Philippine Navy was not patrolling the area due 
to a monsoon season. The Philippines did not engage China militarily, but only chose to 
political protest China’s actions. Richard Cronin surmises that the Philippine Navy 
decided to avoid confrontation, based partially on China’s early confrontation with 
Vietnamese troops, during which the Vietnamese suffered tremendous losses in spite of 
the encounters taking place in Vietnamese-controlled area (Cronin, 2010).  
 Similar protest followed further construction in 1999 of what China called 
‘fishermen’s shelter’. The Philippines however felt it more closely resembled military 
structures and called China’s actions a "creeping invasion"19 because it has been 
gradually trying to build similar structures elsewhere in the Philippines’ EEZ (Cronin, 
2010).  
The Philippines' hedged its bet by deciding not to destroy the Chinese structures 
on Mischief Reef. They chose to avoid an escalation of the dispute. According to the 
Philippines China is always been prepared for armed conflict when opposed, they saw 
the 1974 and 1988 conflicts as evidence for this. If a small 3-hour skirmish could result in 
70 fatalities they feared what a bigger conflict to bring to the region. The Philippines 
feared wider conflict since it is a military ally of the US by treaty and an attack on the 
Philippines would likely escalate to involve the US (Wenweipo, 2009).  
 
18 China and the Philippines have a disagreement over this area. China argues it is part of its ‘nine dashed 
line’ (this is a line outlining the Chinese claims. It was issued to all states on a map in the early 90’) and thus 
qualifies as Chinese territory. The Philippines however claims that under international law it is entitled to its 
EEZ. Considering the EEZ is enshrined in UNCLOS it is consedered to be more respectable, however China 
vehemetly disagrees with this notion, hence the controvesy of the situation (Fravel, 2008, p. 267).  
19 According to the Philippines China has a well-rehearsed routine for slowly claiming other areas. They lay 
claim to a new reef by first putting down buoys and then building concrete markers. After this they build 
temporary wooden or bamboo shelters, and if China was still not challenged, the permanent military forts 
would go up. For this reason the Philippines has tried to destroy the buoys or markers before China has time 
to build larger structures (Cronin, 2010, p. 2). 
 !Tumultuous!Tides ,39,!
 
4.4. Between the lines 
Hedging in this context is however not only clear in a situation where action is 
taken. Sometimes, like in the case of the Philippines it's the lack of action that is evidence 
of the hedge. For example, Vietnam has since 1988 never again confronted China 
militarily. It may have engaged in political protest but not in combat. As the Philippines 
noted, China seems to be prepared for conflict at any given time, as such, in their view, 
they control escalation. By the same reasoning these countries could also have a large say 
in a potential solution. After all, they managed to agree on a joint exploitation agreement 
in 2000 and on a Code of Conduct under the auspices of ASEAN.  
4.5. Striking a balance  
Hedging strategies, while generally applicable, are used most frequently by 
smaller states like Vietnam and the Philippines. They are all about finding a balance 
between not completely yielding to the strongest power and consequentially be absorbed 
into their sphere of influence, and not being in a never-ending conflict. The latter is 
something that is too costly for smaller nations and therefore untenable in the long run. 
For this reason both Vietnam and the Philippines hedge against China, from time to time 
they have to stake their claims but in general they avoid conflict, particularly if history 
has shown it to be largely unsuccessful (Acharya, 2001, p. 21). The end result is the 
absence of escalation, but also the absence of a resolution. Both Vietnam and the 
Philippines have declared their willingness for joint development but to let China take all 
the territory would send the wrong message. As such, regarding a solution, both states 
hedge against annexation since China has no other offers on the table (Dutton, 2011).  
While a mirror analysis the hedging model does not reflect the entire picture, this 
is best done by the third model, that of regional multilateralism. 
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5. ASEAN 
Asian states, especially those in East and Southeast Asia have some experience 
with colonization and oppression by Western states. While they have this shared 
experience they did not have a tremendously strong bond until the advent of the Asian 
Financial Crisis. This period in time was seen as the West still not looking out for Asia 
and finding new ways to keep it down and submissive. For this reason they had already 
come together in an institutional structure named the Association for South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) in 196720. However, around 1990 it became increasingly obvious that 
the challenges they faced were shared and sometimes caused by neighboring countries. 
For this reason Malaysia suggested that ASEAN expand membership (Beeson, 2003). In 
due time more countries joined and eventually in 1995 ASEAN Plus Three was created 
to serve as a coordinator of cooperation between ASEAN states and China, Japan and 
South Korea. From here on, Southeast Asian and East Asian states started to build a 
forum that would uniquely cater to their problems.  
The third model posits that this choice for working in this particular forum in an 
effort to find a resolution has helped to prevent escalation but also precludes the 
resolution of the conflict. For this hypothesis to hold true there should be evidence of a 
lack of escalation since the commitment to ASEAN and there should be evidence of 
substantial difficulty to reach a resolution.  
5.1. Why ASEAN? 
Since ASEAN’s inception there has been a proliferation of regional economic 
agreements as well as engagement in regional institutions that is usually explained in by 
reference to economic factors. Often these agreements have been viewed either as a 
response to the costs and potential benefits of increasing interdependence. Interestingly 
this increased regional cooperation is not a consequence of economics per se. As 
Ravenhill states, rather than there being an ‘economic domino’ effect at work, the new 
Asian regionalism is best understood as being driven by a ‘political domino’ effect 
 
20 The founding members were Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Between this 
time and 1995 membership was expanded to include Brunei, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam. 
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(Ravenhill, 2010). While economic growth is definitely a priority for these nations the 
foundation of ASEAN had to do with a consolidation of power, as ASEAN they would 
be easier to stand against large powers like the EU and Russia.  
At noted previously, it is remarkable that these nations came together for political 
collaboration before they enhanced economic cooperation. Acharya provided a good 
argument that norm acceptation is a crucial factor and that this takes place more easily 
when countries start off already sharing many norms. In the case of ASEAN nations it’s 
because there is a shared history and while the have distinct cultures, many norms (for 
instance concerning family) are norms that cross boundaries. Unlike its predecessors 
ASEAN and ASEAN plus Three has not remained unused, due to the great willingness 
to confront problems together, particularly cross boundary problems (Ravenhill, 2009). 
To summarize, multilateralism in Asia, and ASEAN in particular, has had a number of 
specific economic and political objectives but in each case the processes have had a 
broader underlying objective: they have aimed to establish and develop networks of 
relations among countries in the region and to build and generate confidence within 
those relations, something which was lacking before (Harris, 2000, p. 514). 
ASEAN is a good venue for nations wanting to ‘multilateralise’ shared issues. 
While in the past Vietnam and the Philippines have wanted US involvement, the US 
being a very useful strong partner, this was not an option for China. Hence, there was 
little hope for discussing the issue for example in the UN. China is not quick to enter into 
an international framework. What is interesting then is that already early on China 
showed willingness to participate in ASEAN (ASEAN, 2012). While the CCP was 
originally wary of international structures, over time it became more accepting of them, 
particular when they did not involve western participation. What developed was a 
informal list of requirements for participation in international organizations, these 
included: (1) access to external capital markets, (2) access to external markets for China’s 
exports and imports, (3) international regimes to manage regional and global economic 
volatility, (4) security and governance regimes to manage international energy and 
resource flows, and (5) global regimes that support regional development and stability 
(Rosen, 2008, p. 144). 
China however, still has a preference for bilateral relations, particularly when it 
comes to the South China Sea conflict. It has made many efforts to convince other 
nations of the legitimacy of China’s claim. What has complicated this matter is the legal 
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confusion concerning the validity of China’s claims. What is more, China uses different 
maps and different argumentations with separate states. Whether this is due to antenatal 
confusion or strategy on China’s part remains the question (International Crisis Group, 
2012, p. 7).  
There are a few advantages to deal with the situation in the South China Sea 
within an ASEAN framework. In ASEAN Vietnam, the Philippines and the other parties 
have a strong negotiating position than they have when they make bilateral agreements. 
China sees this as a viable and desirable option because it keeps the US specifically out of 
the conflict. Furthermore, for all parties it gives stability because there is less risk of 
escalation while working towards a solution in a multilateral framework (Newman 
2007). However, there are also downsides, for example, decision-making in international 
organizations is notoriously slow, not only due to the sheer number of people involved 
but also the due to the bureaucracy that surrounds it. Nevertheless, the states involved 
cooperate in order to avoid conflict and have hopes of a resolution. If it were not in their 
interest, they simply would not cooperate (Hernandez, 2011, p. 149). To make clear what 
is at take: (1) the South China Sea is of strategic and economic interests not just for states 
that border it, but also to others that make use of the sea, for passage for example. As 
such, the South China Sea is part of the ‘global commons’ into which there is freedom of 
peaceful access and use; (2) the states involved acknowledge that escalation of tension 
can be a possible trigger for conflict, even if there was no intention to escalate, simply 
because in world politics, perception is a powerful and often an overpowering - factor in 
state behavior; and (3) regardless of which state breaks the frail peace, the costs involved 
will be too high, even for big countries (Hernandez, 2011, p. 153). 
5.2. Peace and resolutions 
Having established that the states involved made a good choice to work toward a 
solution within ASEAN and prevent further escalations, what achievements have been 
made by the states and ASEAN?  
While ASEAN was already established in 1967, not all parties to the conflict 
were members until 1995. In this year Vietnam and China21 were the last members to 
join. Notably, between this time and 2009 there was no escalation of tensions and the 
conflict maintained a low intensity. Essentially what ASEAN set out to do was what the 
 
21 Though China didn’t join ASEAN directly but joined the ASEAN plus Three forum 
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normative framework provided by UNCLOS failed to achieve22. ASEAN aimed to 
provide a political framework for stability. During the late 1990s and into the beginning 
of the new millennium, ASEAN sought to reduce tension and to promote several of its 
founding principles: “to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for 
justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of the region ... and to 
accelerate the [region’s] economic growth.” (Dutton, 2011, p. 178) The need for such a 
process was evident after two decades of instability and even armed conflict in the South 
China Sea, most apparent by the fighting between China and the Republic of Vietnam in 
the Paracels in 1974, the Spratlys in 1988 and finally by the Mischief reef incidents 
between China and the Philippines in 1995 and 1999. With the ascension of Vietnam to 
ASEAN, there was now political unity in Southeast Asia to oppose what was widely 
seen as dangerously disruptive Chinese behavior. Yet, China too turned a corner. By 
1995 it was ripe for cooperation (Dutton, 2011, p. 172). 
The first agreement made was one for joint development of the South China Sea 
by China, Vietnam and the Philippines. While the agreement was not made under the 
auspices of ASEAN it has received credit as the suggestion was made in this context 
(Dutton, 2011, p. 171). However, by far the greatest achievement in ASEAN must be the 
DOC, the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. It took nearly 
seven years, but in 2002 the governments of the member states of ASEAN and China 
entered into the DOC, an agreement that makes five basic declarations: 
1. it reaffirms the parties’ commitment to international law, including UNCLOS; 
2. it commits the parties to explore ways to build trust and confidence among 
them, based on equality and mutual respect; 
3. it commits the parties to respect freedom of navigation and overflight in the 
South China Sea; 
4. it commits the parties to resolve territorial and jurisdictional disputes without 
the threat or use of force; and 
5. it commits parties to refrain from inhabiting presently uninhabited islands 
(ASEAN, 2002). 
 
22 describe objective 
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Ever since the establishment of the DOC, ASEAN has been trying to negotiate its 
implementation. To this effect a China - ASEAN joint working group on the 
implementation of the DOC has been established and has since met six times over nine 
years. Unfortunately it failed to produce significant results; it was even unsuccessful to 
find agreement on formally putting it on the agenda of the East Asia Summit. (Valencia, 
2011, p. 85). The fundamental point of disagreement is that China maintains that South 
China Sea issues should be settled bilaterally with ASEAN members individually (or at 
least those that have a stake in the conflict), rather than jointly as a block of countries. 
Nevertheless one of the paragraphs of the earlier draft DOC reads “ASEAN will continue 
the present practice of consultations among themselves before meeting with China.” 
(Dutton, 2011, p. 174) This has caused China great offense and as such it refuses to send 
officials to the meetings.  
All in all, resolution of the South China Sea Conflict appears to be very far away. 
Peter Dutton argues this is precisely because the parties seek a resolution within an 
ASEAN framework. It can be argued that the process is a dilatory tactic to wait until 
ASEAN has arrived at a consensus on the disputes. Other than the fact that the 1992 
ASEAN members took a collective stand against China and issued a Declaration on the 
South China Sea, the agreement on the DOC, and a Code of Conduct on the South 
China Sea, an ASEAN consensus is unlikely. This can be blamed on the fact that four of 
its member states are rival claimants, and the others have varying degrees of political, 
diplomatic, and economic closeness to China. Essentially, only when ASEAN’s 
collective integrity is challenged can a consensus be expected to emerge (much like the 
financial crisis of 1997). The South China Sea disputes are not part of this collective 
integrity, since they involve individual member states (Dutton, 2011, p. 177). As such, it 
is unlike that the parties will come together soon to find a solution. Too many competing 
claims mean it will be difficult to find a solution if there is no common ground or 
common goal. While the situation now is undesirable, there is also no solution where all 
parties win. Hence, a resolution seems far out of sight. These issues are all part and 
parcel of the downsides of working multilaterally in an international organization 
(Harris, 2000, p. 511). Considering the parties have not taken serious steps for a 
resolution in a different form or way, it appears they are contented enough to put up with 
the status quo (Wenweipo, 2009).  
Seeing as since 1995 there has been a notable absence of escalation, it appears 
that working within a multilateral framework has helped prevent further escalations. 
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However, the best support for the regional multilateralism is found in the absence of a 
resolution. Due to the conflicting and overlapping claims it is hard to strike a consensus 
with all parties. Particularly when all nine parties disagree and no blocks can be formed. 
The framework emboldens the smaller nations and gives them greater negotiating power 
and in turn constricts that of China. Absent of a significant Chinese consensus there is 
not much that will steer this process toward a solution. 
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6. Conclusion 
The South China Sea has been subject of much discussion and debate for many 
years. Small bursts of conflict have been followed by more periods of tension, but what 
has stood out most is that the region has neither seen large-scale violent conflict nor true 
peace. It appears as though a resolution is firmly out of sight and escalation is closer 
every day. This is a particularly interesting conundrum for researchers as it has always 
been presumed that escalation was a real possibility; after all, China had evidence that it 
was a militarily dominant power and given gravitas of other conflicts going on, it could 
well have gotten away with annexation (Mearsheimer, 2010). Interestingly the status quo 
has persisted and so this research aims to contribute to a better understanding of the 
conflict by exploring it from the perspective of three different theoretical models. The 
first, processual constructivism, was used to look particularly at China’s role. With the 
second model, hedging, the roles of Vietnam and the Philippines were more closely 
explored; and the third, regional multilateralism, was not applied to cater to a specific 
group but considers all parties to the conflict.  
Processual constructivism is a relatively new theory that has not yet been applied 
to the situation of the South China Sea, yet it has substantial explanatory power where it 
concerns China’s foreign policy creation. It highlights the presence of competing 
identities that have been formed through interaction with different actors within China, 
but also through China’s relations with other states. The hierarchical approach China 
takes toward its neighbors is both old and new. China in the past sought to legitimize its 
own government through tributary relationships, which in turn legitimized the 
governments of the states providing the tributes. The way China treats other states now is 
much the same, it has not lost its old way of thinking (China is the superior nation) and 
offers benefits for those who support it. This translates into the way foreign policy actors 
plan their strategy, though, through interaction with each other, identity has started to 
shift. There are those that advocate a peaceful Chinese rise to power, in which China also 
takes on duties expected of great powers (promoting cooperation in international fora, 
partaking in peacekeeping missions and the like). However, these different identities tend 
to clash. Due to the great variety of actors involved in foreign policymaking, and the 
great variety of actors that can put it into action, the result is a mix of contradictory 
actions and discourse unbefitting of a rising power. Essentially what results is a great 
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power with small power behavior. What is more, the government is slowly loosing its 
grip on those parties involved, thus increasing the risk of escalation in the future. While 
in this scenario a solution would be desirable, it is not feasible for the moment. 
Furthermore, the contradictory nature of both actions and discourse have made 
Chinese behavior unpredictable and perceived as volatile. This alone creates unease with 
other nations. During the early years, when there was still more agreement on course of 
action there were instances of armed conflict (1974 and 1988), however brief or long. 
Since then, the number of distinct voices has been growing, as has the tension in the 
region. Yet the options for a resolution have been dwindling as well, because unilateral 
actions on the part of provinces and the military have made negotiations within ASEAN 
increasingly difficult. The prospects for a solution are abysmal because the ministry of 
foreign affairs is losing its significance as other government bodies with more weight will 
not submit to their coordination and their views simply are too contradictory.   
Hedging in turn proves very insightful from the point of view of Vietnam and the 
Philippines. Vietnam, having a tumultuous relationship with China has often hedged 
against losing too much of its territory. It has found itself in armed conflict with China on 
several occasions, however, only twice where the South China Sea was concerned, and 
comparatively on a very limited scale. While Vietnam could not and cannot balance 
against China, it has hedged against further infringement to its territory. Vietnam has had 
various successes with its hedges. In 1974 its forces were obliterated by China and the 
entire territory was annexed. In 1988 it may have lost the battle against the Chinese 
troops but it did manage to secure some of the territory post conflict. 
The Philippines have also hedged against Chinese dominance in the region but at 
the same time they also hedged against military confrontation by choosing to only 
politically protest the construction of what they viewed as military bases in the Mischief 
Reef. Considering this region falls within the EEZ, the Philippines has the best 
enforceable claim. However, it realized that escalation would not be in its best interest. 
Hence, it becomes evident that some hedging strategies are evident in the absence of 
action. By varying between engagement and retreat the situation in the South China Sea 
has been constantly tense but never came to a severe escalation. However, the question 
remains whether the absence of escalation can be contributed to the actions of the 
Philippines. It has recently been suggested that China’s behavior then was influenced by 
external factors like its relationship with ASEAN and its conformity with the 
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multilateralist framework in international relations (Valencia, 2011). It has been argued 
that China may have softened its tone because it sought ASEAN’s favor then. 
Considering the conciliatory and peaceful objectives of ASEAN, confrontation could not 
be the way forward. China needed a peaceful environment for its “peaceful rise” and had 
to project a good image (Hernandez, 2011).  
Ultimately, the benefits and constraints of regional multilateralism provide the 
best explanation for the situation in the South China Sea. Multilateralism and economic 
development have been mutually reinforcing in establishing a normative framework for 
the region in the form of ASEAN. The framework set up in ASEAN secures the 
following: (1) a security framework of norms as exemplified in the region-wide 
acceptance of the principles of the its Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, (2) ability to 
achieve peaceful resolution of international conflicts; as well as, the (3) the acceptance of 
the principles of liberal trade and the acceptance of economic interdependence as a 
contributor to economic growth. The biggest strength is the general compatibility with 
principles laid down in global institutions (Harris, 2000, p. 513). 
Since 1995, when all the parties to the conflict were members of ASEAN (and 
ASEAN plus Three), the conflict has remained at low intensity and has not escalated; yet 
no resolution has been reached either. Both are supported by the basic tenets of 
multilateralism in international institutions; that is, that when parties commit to finding a 
solution there, and when they support the objectives of the organization, they won’t be 
quick to jeopardize the benefits. Out of all the various institutions where the conflict 
could be discussed, ASEAN provides the best solution for all parties involved. China gets 
a forum where the US is not involved or allowed, and the other states can consolidate 
their power. What is more, if the other states would move this issue to a different venue 
China would most likely back out and the possibilities for a solution would disappear. 
This is not to say that the opportunities for a resolution within ASEAN are great, in fact, 
they are almost non-existent as well. This is why this theory works best. Because of the 
great number of actors with competing interests, multilateralism supports the idea that 
decision-making is notoriously slow. While the norms of these states may converge, their 
interests do not. As such, the conflict remains in a perpetual impasse.  
The three models explored in this research are effectively complementary. The 
first and second model are mirror analyses that each explore a side of the coin. The third 
model looks at these parties in an international context. Arguably this results in a fourth 
diversified explanatory model based on the three proposed models because the three 
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proposed models are complementary. In the end, the first two models are best suited to 
explain why no escalation has taken place and the third model is best suited to explain 
why still no resolution has been found. Hence, the fourth model effectively answers the 
main question. The perpetuation of the South China Sea conflict is caused by Southeast 
Asian states hedging against escalation and China’s identity crisis, which fails to establish 
unitary action but prevents escalation; the conflict drags on because the multilateral 
framework of ASEAN equalizes the power positions in the negotiations where little 
common ground is found due to the overlapping competing claims. 
While many researchers set out to find a singular model to explain a situation, it 
appears as though this conflict, characterized by a plethora of actors and competing 
overlapping claims, warrants a richer explanation that takes the individual backgrounds 
of each actor into account. Past suggestions for resolutions either ignore the complexity 
of Chinese foreign policymaking or ignore the relevance and power of the smaller states 
involved. This research, though it does not find a single model explanation, takes more 
facets into consideration and contributes to a greater understanding of the underlying 
causes for the perpetuation of the conflict. 
Future research aiming at finding a resolution appears to be without point. As 
many of the quoted researchers have noted, the likelihood of a resolution has grown 
slimmer by the day. Taking into account the recent US pivot to Asia, some argue this 
resolution is complete out of the question (Hernandez, 2011, p. 153). Recent research 
does however suggest interesting new avenues for research. The ICG has suggested that 
the key to the resolution lies in China, which seems a credible statement given the 
outcomes of this research that China has little room to move in either direction. 
However, other researchers have suggested that there is a greater complexity involved on 
the part of Southeast Asian nations, particularly Malaysia’s lack of participation is found 
perplexing (Li M. , 2011, p. 199). As such, it would be interesting to see whether 
processual constructivism could successfully be applied in these cases as well. The only 
way forward out of perpetual tension is through greater understanding and more 
information. 
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